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QUEER EYE FOR THE MILITARY GUY:
WILL "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" SURVIVE
IN THE WAKE OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS?
GAVIN W. SCOTTI, JR.t
"Bowers v. Hardwick [is] a decision ... similar in its bias and
prejudice to Plessy v. Ferguson. I remain confident that some-
day a Supreme Court with a sense of fairness and an adequate
vision of the Constitution will repudiate Bowers in the same
way that a wise and fair-minded Court once repudiated
Plessy. "'
INTRODUCTION
With its landmark decision Lawrence v. Texas,2 the Supreme
Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and held that homosexuals
enjoy a constitutionally protected right to engage in private in-
timate conduct. 3 The holding has cast doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of the controversial military policy excluding open ho-
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 1997,
Georgetown University.
' Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Bowers v. Hardwick was a 1986 case
where the Court initially found there was no fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy. 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472, 2484 (2003) (holding homosexuals possess a constitutionally protected liberty
to engage in consensual sexual conduct). Similarly, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court
initially upheld segregation under the "separate but equal" doctrine before later
overruling the decision in 1954. 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
3 See id. at 2478, 2484 (holding that "[tihe liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make [the] choice" to engage in intimate
conduct within the confines of their own homes, thus overruling Bowers).
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mosexuals.4 This Clinton-era compromise, embodied in the 1994
National Defense Authorization Act, is commonly referred to as
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT).5 Under the policy, neither an
4 See Press Release, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military,
Legal Scholars Question Whether Sodomy Ruling Will Affect Military Gay Ban
(June 26, 2003), http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edulPressCenter/press.rel_
2003_0626P.htm. ("[L]egal experts on sexuality in the military said today that the
Pentagon's ban on openly gay soldiers could come under increasing legal scru-
tiny.... [P]rominent legal scholars suggested that [Lawrence v. Texas] may erode
the rationale for continuing to ban both sodomy and openly gay soldiers, while oth-
ers disagreed.").
5 Aaron Belkin, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Neces-
sity?, PARAMETERS, Summer 2003, at 108, available at http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03summer/belkin.pdf Professor Belkin is director
of the University of California at Santa Barbara's Center for the Study of Sexual
Minorities in the Military. Id. at 109; see also Elizabeth Crawford, U.S. Army Jour-
nal Publishes Professor's Critique of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy on Gay Soldiers,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., (June 27, 2003), available at http://chronicle.
com/prm/weekly/v49/i42/42aO1301.htm (describing Professor Belkin's article and
expressing surprise that it was published in a U.S. Army quarterly read by senior
military officers).
Upon his election to the Presidency, Bill Clinton attempted to fulfill his cam-
paign promise to lift the military ban on homosexuals. He was opposed, however, by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prominent members of Congress. He persevered, and
on January 29, 1993, he abolished the former outright military ban on homosexuals.
After six months of hearings, Congress formulated the current policy. Belkin, supra
note 5, at 108; see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 921-23 (4th Cir. 1996). The
directive implementing the National Defense Authorization Act provides that a ser-
vicemember's statement that he is a homosexual 'creates a rebuttable presumption
that he engages in homosexual acts or has a propensity or intent to do so."' Id. at
920 (citations omitted).
The [servicemember] is informed of this presumption and afforded an op-
portunity to rebut it by presenting appropriate evidence. Whether the pre-
sumption has been rebutted is determined by a variety of factors: whether
the [servicemember] has engaged in homosexual acts; the [servicemem-
ber's] credibility; testimony from others about the [servicemember's] past
conduct; the nature and circumstances of the [servicemember's] statement;
and any other evidence relevant to whether the [servicemember] has a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.
Id. (citing DoD Dir. 1332.40, Encl. 2, E2.3.1.2 to E2.3.1.5, at 10 (Sept. 16, 1997)).
The Act has been codified in 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994):
§ 654. Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States
commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and sup-
port armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces.
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces.
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of
the Constitution of the United States, it lies within the discretion
of the Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of
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applicant for military service, nor a person currently serving,
may be asked about his sexual orientation, unless there is reason
to suspect he may be gay. s Once a servicemember discloses that
service in the armed forces.
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are character-
ized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion.
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit
cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service
members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit
greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual
unit members.
(12) ... [L]iving ... and working conditions.., are often...
characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstand-
ing element of military law that continues to be necessary in the
unique circumstances of military service.
(14) The armed forces must.., exclude persons whose pres-
ence ... would create an unacceptable risk to the.., morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability.
(15) The presence ... of [homosexuals] ... would create an unac-
ceptable risk to the [armed forces'] high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion ....
(b) POLIcY.-A member of the armed forces shall be separated from
the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of De-
fense if one or more of the following findings is made and approved in
accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in... a homosexual act...
unless.., the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and
customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all circumstances, is unlikely to re-
cur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coer-
cion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the mem-
ber's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent
with the interests of the armed forces in proper discipline,
good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to en-
gage in homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual .... unless there is a further finding .... that the mem-
ber has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages
in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or in-
tends to engage in homosexual acts.
Id.
6 Belkin, supra note 5, at 109.
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he is gay or is caught engaging in homosexual conduct, he is sub-
ject to discharge-with limited exceptions.7
DADT has been challenged several times on constitutional
grounds.8 The circuit courts, however, have upheld the policy,
usually relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Bowers.9 The
Supreme Court, meanwhile, has refused to rule on DADT's con-
stitutionality five times since its implementation in 1993.10
The world has changed during the ten years since DADT
took effect. The surprising overnight success of the television
show Queer Eye for the Straight Guy demonstrates the ever-
increasing level of mainstream acceptance of homosexuality. 1
This Note examines the issue of whether, in the wake of Law-
rence, the military's policy of excluding open homosexuals will
continue to pass constitutional muster. In order to answer this
question, this Note addresses two sub-issues: (1) what are the
limits of judicial deference to the executive and legislative
branches with regard to military regulations, and (2) is it possi-
ble today to continue to justify DADT?
I. BACKGROUND: LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Lawrence v. Texas,12 which invalidated a
Texas statute that outlawed homosexual sodomy 13 and overruled
'Id; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654.
8 See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
9 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
'0 See Thorne v. Dep't of Def., 139 F.3d 893 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 947 (1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Selland v. Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert denied, 520 U.S. 1210 (1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996).
" See Michael Giltz, Queer Eye Confidential, ADvOCATE, Sept. 2, 2003, avail-
able at http:www.advocate.comfhtml/stories/897/897-queereye-mag.asp; Andrew
Wallerstein, 'Queer Eye' Guys, NBC Do Contract Make Over (Oct. 31, 2003), at
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u/nm/20031031/en_
nm/television-queer dc 4.
12 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
13 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003), repealed by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
Homosexual Conduct.
(a) A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual inter-
course with another individual of the same sex.
(b) An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor.
Id; see also Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, Inc., 122 F.3d 308, 310-11 (5th Cir.
900 [Vol.78:897
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its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.14 The Court thus se-
verely limited the permissible scope of morals-based legislation. 15
The holding was surprising both in its wholesale rejection of
Bowers and its far-reaching implications.' 6 Because states may
no longer prohibit private, consensual sodomy, military policies
that exclude open homosexuals may now be unconstitutional. 7
The effects of Lawrence are already apparent, for example in the
realm of family law. In November 2003, Massachusetts' highest
court, in a decision predicted to have ramifications throughout
the country, held that same-sex couples are entitled to marry
under the state's constitution.' 8 It stands to reason that Law-
rence will influence many other areas of the law, including mili-
tary regulations. This section will briefly examine the holding in
1997) (holding it is slander per se to call a person gay, a faggot, queer, or anything
else indicating that the person is a homosexual, because it imputes the crime of sod-
omy to that person).
14 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting). State laws against
bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, for-
nication, bestiality, and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers' valida-
tion of laws based on moral choices .... The law," it is said, "is constantly based on
notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."
Id. (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196). It is interesting (and telling) that Justice
Scalia declined to attempt to distinguish between homosexual sex and incest or bes-
tiality.
16 See David G. Savage, In Rulings, Echoes of 1992: The High Court Stuns Con-
servatives-Just as It Did More Than a Decade Ago, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2003, at 21, 22.
[I]t soon became clear [that Justice] Kennedy was not citing Bowers to fol-
low as precedent, but rather to admit that the court had erred-and badly
SO.
In Bowers, the Court had ridiculed the gay rights claim, saying it was "at
best facetious" to say the Constitution confers on homosexuals a "right to
engage in sodomy." This focus on a "particular sex act... demeans" the
basic claim to liberty and privacy at issue, Kennedy said.
Gays and lesbians are entitled to "respect" and "dignity" in their personal
lives, he said, and the Constitution does not permit laws that amount to
"state-sponsored condemnation" of homosexuals.
Id. at 22.
17 See Press Release, supra note 4 (noting that prominent legal scholars believe
the recent Supreme Court ruling may chip away at the constitutional rationale for
upholding DADT, although admittedly there is disagreement on this point).
"8 Pam Belluck, Marriage by Gays Gains Big Victory in Massachusetts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al. Despite the protestations of Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor that Lawrence has not opened the door for the legalization of gay mar-
riage, the decision may prove to have just that effect. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme
Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling With Sodomy Law Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2003, at A24.
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Lawrence as a means of taking a first step toward anticipating
the implications of the decision for the continued viability of
DADT.
Two main cases form the background against which the Su-
preme Court decided Lawrence: Bowers v. Hardwick1 9 and Romer
v. Evans.20 In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy
statute that outlawed all sodomy, not just homosexual sodomy. 21
The Court, however, addressed the case as if the main issue
dealt with the rights-or lack thereof-of homosexuals. 22 Profes-
sor William N. Eskridge, Jr. offered an in-depth critique of Bow-
ers.23 He argued that the 5-4 decision "rested upon an anachro-
nistic treatment of sodomy regulation at the time of the Fifth
(1791) or Fourteenth (1868) Amendments. '24 Central to the
Court's analysis was its belief that the due process right of pri-
vacy could only be applied to protect those fundamental liberties
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."25 The slim
'9 478 U.S. 186 (1996).
20 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
21 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (noting that at the time the "Georgia Code
Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) provide[d], in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A person com-
mits... sodomy when he performs... any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another.... (b) A person convicted of... sod-
omy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years.").
22 Id. at 188 ("The only claim properly before the Court... is Hardwick's chal-
lenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. We ex-
press no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other
acts of sodomy.").
23 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 631, 631 n.*. Professor Eskridge is the John A. Garver Professor of Jurispru-
dence at Yale Law School. He received his B.A. from Davidson College in 1973, his
M.A. from Harvard University in 1974 and his J.D. from Yale Law School in 1978.
Id. at n.*.
24 Id. at 631 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, he asserted that the framers of
those amendments could not have understood sodomy laws as regulating oral inter-
course (Hardwick's crime) or as focusing on "homosexual sodomy" (the Court's fo-
cus). Before this century, Sodomy regulation sought to ensure that sexual intimacy
only occured within the context of procreative marriage. Today, this represents an
unconstitutional basis for criminal law under the Court's privacy jurisprudence. Id.;
see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a Con-
necticut law criminalizing the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded
upon the right of marital privacy).
25 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 632 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192). Because
homosexual sodomy had long been criminal in Anglo-American law, the Court held
that there was no "deeply rooted" liberty Hardwick could claim and, indeed, that
Hardwick's fundamental rights claim was "at best, facetious." Id. (citing Bowers,
478 U.S. at 194). The Court was not "inclined to take a more expansive view of [its]
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majority, however, did not easily come to this conclusion. The
critical fifth vote, Justice Lewis Powell, came after he reportedly
switched sides as a result of powerful lobbying from the Chief
Justice. 26 Powell later admitted that he came to regret his deci-
sion.27 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has also
criticized Bowers,28 suggesting in 1992 that anti-sodomy laws
would be subject to attack on equal protection grounds.29
In Romer v. Evans,30 the Court struck down a Colorado con-
stitutional amendment that prohibited legislative, executive, or
judicial action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimina-
tion. 31 Evans was decided on equal protection grounds 32 and,
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause."
The majority stated that the "Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to ille-
gitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cogni-
zable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. Bowers, 478 U.S. at
194.
26 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 633.
27 Id. Justice Powell, while ultimately agreeing with the majority that there
was no substantive right under the Due Process Clause to engage in homosexual
sodomy, went on to assert:
This is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in
this case ... authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for
a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence
for such conduct-certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a se-
rious Eighth Amendment issue.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Powell, J. concurring).
28 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 346 (1992).
Perhaps the strongest argument for Michael Hardwick was that statutes
which criminalize homosexual behavior express an irrational fear and
loathing of a group that has been subjected to discrimination .... The po-
sition of the homosexual is difficult at best, even in a tolerant society,
which our society is not quite; and it is made worse ... by statutes that
condemn the homosexual's characteristic methods of sexual expression as
vile crimes (the Georgia statute carried a maximum punishment of twenty
years in prison).
Id.
29 Id. at 348. Posner suggested that "there is no rational basis for treating ho-
mosexuals and heterosexuals differently" and that discrimination based upon a per-
son's sexual preference, as opposed to his conduct (as the military used to do in the
days prior to DADT), is "suspect because sexual preference is a largely immutable
characteristic and therefore analogous to sex and race, which under the jurispru-
dence of equal protection are-race especially-highly disfavored grounds for dis-
crimination." Id.
30 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31 Id at 623-24 (explaining a law must be neutral when a person's rights are
involved). 'Ve must conclude that [the statute] classifies homosexuals not to further
a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado
cannot do." Id. at 635.
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therefore, did not overrule Bowers, which was decided on due
process grounds. 33 Evans focused on status rather than conduct.
Nonetheless, the two decisions did "not rest easily together in
the same logic set."34 Justice Antonin Scalia recognized this ap-
parent inconsistency in his Evans dissent.35
In Lawrence v. Texas, 36 the Supreme Court held that the
Texas law, which criminalized private, adult, consensual sod-
omy, was an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty right protected by the Due Process Clause.37
The Court had previously held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion."38 With Lawrence, the Court has extended that protection
32 Id. at 623, 635.
3 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (expressing reluctance
to strike down the law on due process grounds because it would be illegitimate to
allow "judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the lan-
guage or design of the Constitution.").
3 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 634-35 (noting that although the two cases fo-
cused on separate grounds their conclusions had a profound affect on homosexuals).
35 Evans, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is constitutionally per-
missible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal [like in Hardwick], surely
it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct ... [or] merely prohibiting all levels of state government from
bestowing special protections upon homosexual conduct."); Eskridge, supra note 23,
at 634. 'The six-justice Evans majority failed to deny, much less refute, this asser-
tion." Id. at 635; see also Evans, 517 U.S. at 623-36.
36 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
37 See id. at 2484 ("[The petitioners'] right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of
the government.").
38 Id. at 2481 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
The Ninth Amendment also has been invoked to support the proposition that we
have an inherent right to liberty, although it is not commonly used in this manner.
It states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
IX.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). The Court more commonly invokes the Fourteenth Amendment in its pro-
tection of liberty rights. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 168 (1973) (hold-
ing that a woman's right to have an abortion is protected as an exercise of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending the holding in Griswold beyond the marital rela-
tionship by stating that a Massachusetts law, which allowed the distribution of con-
traceptives to married persons but not to unmarried persons, was violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85
(holding that the Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives, as applied
to married persons, was unconstitutional because it violated the "zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees," including the First,
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to intimate homosexual relationships.3 9 The Court observed that
infrequent and inconsistent enforcement of anti-sodomy laws
undermined their legitimacy. 40 It intentionally declined to over-
turn the Texas law solely on equal protection grounds because it
wanted to make clear that private, intimate conduct between
consenting adults was now beyond the reach of state regula-
tion. 41 The Court drew upon the "broad statements of the sub-
stantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier
cases."42 It did not explicitly state that the Bowers Court erred
in holding that there was no fundamental constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; rather, it couched its conclusion
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-36 (1925) (holding that a state act compelling students to
attend public schools was unconstitutional because it violated the liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403
(1923) (holding that a Nebraska law banning the teaching of foreign languages to
students below eighth grade was unconstitutional).
[Tihe liberty... [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extends beyond
the] freedom from bodily restraint [and includes] the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
39 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
40 Id. at 2480-81. The Court cited the American Law Institute:
In 1955 the American Law Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code
and made clear that it did not recommend or provide for "criminal penal-
ties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private." It justified its
decision on three grounds: (1) The prohibitions undermined respect for the
law by penalizing conduct many people engaged in; (2) the statutes regu-
lated private conduct not harmful to others; and 3) the laws were arbitrar-
ily enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail.
Id. at 2480 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2, at 372 (1980) and MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5, at 277-80 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)). Furthermore, despite
the fact that all fifty states had outlawed sodomy prior to 1961, the prohibitions
were widely ignored. Id. at 2481.
41 Id. at 2482. "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differ-
ently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex partici-
pants." Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy recognized the distinction between Bowers and
Lawrence. Justice O'Connor, however, disagreed with the majority and asserted
that Bowers should have been upheld, while the Texas statute should have been
struck down as a violation of equal protection. Id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
42 Id. at 2476; see supra note 38 for a brief description of five such cases.
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in terms of liberty. 43 Justice Scalia noted this omission in his
dissent, where he criticized the majority for both failing to state
explicitly that such a right existed and failing to provide consti-
tutional support for the assertion.44
The impact of Lawrence became apparent on July 7, 2003
when former Army Lieutenant Colonel Loren S. Loomis, who
was discharged for homosexual conduct, filed suit in the Wash-
ington D.C. federal district court challenging the constitutional-
ity of DADT. 45
43 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about
the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here
are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particu-
lar sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.
Id. The Court went on to state that Bowers had "misapprehended the claim of lib-
erty" presented to it and that it was incorrect to state the claim in that case as one
of "whether there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy." Id.
" Id. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]owhere does the Court's opinion de-
clare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process
Clause."). This is literally true, however, the Court seemed to implicitly say that
there is such a right when it stated the following:
The State cannot demean [homosexuals'] existence or control their destiny
by making their private sexual conduct a crime .... It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the govern-
ment may not enter." The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state inter-
est which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.
Id. at 2484 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). Justice
Scalia went on to assert that the overturning of Bowers represented "a massive dis-
ruption of the current social order." Id. at 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45 See Gay Man, Citing Supreme Court Ruling, Fights '97 Army Discharge, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2003, at A14 (noting that according to Jon Davidson, senior counsel
at Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (a gay rights group), this is the first
lawsuit filed using the landmark ruling in Lawrence as precedent); Phillip Carter,
Judicial Deference to the Military: How It Will Affect Court Cases Involving Gay
Rights, and War on Terrorism Policies, FINDLAW LEGAL COMMENT (July 15, 2003),
at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030715_carter.html.
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II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY IS WARRANTED
WHERE THE INFRINGEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IS
NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMED
FORCES.
When a law is challenged on due process or equal protection
grounds it is presumed to be valid and is subject only to rational
basis review, which requires merely that the law be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.46 However, where a
challenged law draws suspect or quasi-suspect classifications
based on certain immutable factors, such as race, or infringes
upon fundamental constitutional rights, courts subject the law to
strict scrutiny and require that it be "narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."47  The circuit courts have applied
rational basis review to laws affecting homosexuals. This is be-
cause homosexuality was not a suspect classification; there was
no fundamental right to engage in homosexual acts.48 Because
Lawrence has identified a right to liberty that protects homosex-
ual acts, DADT infringes upon the constitutionally protected
4 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993). The presumption of va-
lidity places the burden on the party challenging the law to prove that there is no
rational basis to support it. Id. at 320 (citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
41 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,
724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Norris listed the factors used
by the Supreme Court to determine whether a classification is "suspect" so as to
warrant strict scrutiny analysis. The first factor is whether the group has suffered a
history of discrimination. He asserted that the Army itself conceded that this is the
case with regard to homosexuals. The second factor is whether the discrimination
embodies a gross unfairness that is so contrary to the concept of equal protection
that it qualifies as "invidious." This requirement is necessary because "discrimina-
tion exists against some groups because the animus is warranted-no one could se-
riously argue that burglars form a suspect class." Id. at 724. Judge Norris implied
that discrimination against gays is invidious because empirical evidence proves that
sexual orientation does not bear on one's ability to perform in the military. Id. at
725. The third factor is "whether the group burdened by official discrimination lacks
the political power necessary to obtain redress from the political branches of gov-
ernment." Id. at 726. Judge Norris asserted that homosexuals have historically been
"victimized by political bodies." Id. at 727. He therefore concluded that homosexual-
ity is a suspect classification. Id. at 728. However, the Circuit Courts have not
agreed with this conclusion. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
48 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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rights of homosexuals and will likely be subjected to strict scru-
tiny in the future.
A. How Courts Historically Have Dealt With the Issue of
Deference to the Military
The Supreme Court lacks the constitutional authority that is
shared by the President and Congress with regard to the mili-
tary; therefore, it has generally deferred to the other two
branches, or to the military itself, in cases involving the in-
fringement of constitutional rights in the military context.49 In
Korematsu v. United States,50 the Court upheld a military order
providing for the internment of Japanese-Americans in reloca-
tion centers. 51  While recognizing that "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect," the Court pointed out that not all such restric-
tions are unconstitutional. 52 Such restrictions, according to the
Court, are subject to rigid scrutiny, 53 but the Court neglected to
perform this strict scrutiny analysis that it claimed was neces-
sary. Instead, it deferred to the judgment of military authorities,
who determined that Japanese-Americans posed a significant se-
curity threat. 54
49 Carter, supra note 45; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2;
U.S. CONST. art. III.
50 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
5' Id. at 223-24; see also Richard Nunan, Gays in the Military and Constitu-
tional Deference, NEWSLETTER ON PHIL. & LAW (American Philosophical Associa-
tion, University of Delaware), Fall 1997, available at http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/a
rchive/newsletters/v97nl/lawmilitary.asp.
52 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
13 Id. The Court went on to state that "[p]ressing public necessity may some-
times justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can." Id.
" Id. at 217-18. "Here ... 'we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress."' Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)); see also id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("If a
military order ... does not transcend the means appropriate for conducting war,
such action by the military is as constitutional."). The dissent pointed out that, in
ruling upon the constitutionality of the executive order, the Court did not first at-
tempt to determine whether the internment of Japanese-Americans was actually
necessary in order to further national security. See id. at 233-35 (Murphy, J., dis-
senting).
In dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a war,
we must accord great respect and consideration to the judgments of the
military authorities who are on the scene and who have full knowledge of
the military facts. The scope of their discretion must, as a matter of neces-
sity and common sense, be wide. And their judgments ought not to be over-
ruled lightly by those whose training and duties ill-equip them to deal in-
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In Rostker v. Goldberg,55 the Court held that the Military Se-
lective Service Act,56 which excluded women from the draft, was
constitutional because "[t]he exemption of women from registra-
tion [was] not only sufficiently, but [was] also closely, related to
Congress' purpose in authorizing registration."57 In justifying its
deference to the military, the Court noted that "in the context of
Congress' authority over national defense and military af-
fairs,... the Court [must] accord[] Congress greater deference
[than in perhaps all other areas]."58
The Court held in Goldman v. Weinberger59 that an Air
Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of a yarmulke while in
uniform did not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of
religious expression because it was justified by the disciplinary
interest of the Air Force. 60 Once again, the Court recognized the
importance of judicial deference to the military.61 At first, it ap-
peared that the Court made some attempt to examine the chal-
lenged regulation.62 As the dissent pointed out, however, "[t]he
telligently with matters so vital to the physical security of the nation.
At the same time, however, it is essential that there be definite limits to
military discretion .... Individuals must not be left impoverished of their
constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither sub-
stance nor support .... "What are the allowable limits of military discre-
tion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case,
are judicial questions."
Id. at 233-34 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932)).
" 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
56 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-73 (2000).
57 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79.
" Id. at 64-65 ("Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in this
area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked.").
'9 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
o Id. at 509-10.
61 Id. at 507.
Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment
grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws
or regulations designed for civilian society. The military need not encour-
age debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required
of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its mission the
military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit
de corps.... [W]hen evaluating whether military needs justify a particular
restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great defer-
ence to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
62 See id. at 508.
The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the tradi-
tional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the
20041
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Court simply restate[d] [the Air Force's] assertions without offer-
ing any explanation how the exception Dr. Goldman requests
reasonably could interfere with the Air Force's interests. Had
the Court given actual consideration to Goldman's claim, it
would have been compelled to decide in his favor."63
Korematsu and Goldman involved military directives that
were not the subject of extensive congressional debate.64 The
two cases thus differed from those challenging DADT, which was
born of executive and legislative action involving lengthy debate
and examination. 65 Because the Court regularly reviews execu-
tive and legislative actions, 66 DADT is perhaps due less defer-
ence than the challenged rules in Korematsu and Goldman,
which were purely military directives. 6 However, several cases
indicate that the circuit courts often defer to the executive and
legislative branches in military matters.68 It remains to be seen
whether the Supreme Court will afford the same deference to
DADT as it has to past military policies.69
subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall
group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tend-
ing to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank.
The Air Force considers them as vital during peacetime as during war be-
cause its personnel must be ready to provide an effective defense on a mo-
ment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be devel-
oped in advance of trouble.
Id.
63 Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 See id. at 508 (challenging Air Force regulation: AFR 35-10); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944) (challenging military directive, Exclu-
sion Order No. 34, based on Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942)).
65 See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Center
for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Senior Admiral Says Lifting Gay
Ban Would Strengthen Military (Aug. 21, 2003), at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu
/PressCenter/press rel 2003_0821P.htm. "Since Congress made the gay ban a fed-
eral statute, the Pentagon cannot overturn the policy without Congressional action."
Id. Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, retired, Judge Advocate General for the Navy,
asserted that Congress would not oppose the lifting of the ban if the Department of
Defense declared that the policy should be abandoned. Id.
6 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S 579 (1952) (re-
viewing the President's Executive Order to seize and operate steel mills).
67 Even purely military directives, however, ought not receive unquestioning
deference. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1439-40 (1997) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 55 (1971)) ("When the military
steps over [the] bounds [of civil liberties], it leaves the area of its expertise and for-
sakes its domain. The matter then becomes one for civilian courts to resolve, consis-
tent with the statutes and with the Constitution.") (alterations in original).
68 See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
69 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, before DADT, courts
showed a willingness to limit the scope of judicial deference to
the military regarding the exclusion of homosexuals. For exam-
ple, in Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy,70 the Eastern
District of California refused to defer to the military's judg-
ment.7 1 In that case, the plaintiff serviceman was discharged
from the Navy in 1982 for stating in an official interview that he
was gay.72 The court refused simply to accept the validity of the
military's "homosexual exclusion policy"73 based solely on the
judgment of the coequal branches of government and the mili-
tary, without first examining it to determine its underlying ba-
sis.74 Nonetheless, the court accorded the military decision a
high degree of deference.7 5 The court rejected the reasoning used
by the government in support of its exclusion policy, observing
that "[the government] concede[s] that ... homosexuals may
serve in the Navy provided that they do not reveal their sexual
orientation to others. Apparently, as long as heterosexual ser-
vice-members.., do not know exactly who is homosexual, they
do not object to working, showering and living with homosexu-
als."76 Accordingly, the court ordered the Navy to reinstate Dahl,
identifying a violation of Fifth Amendment equal protection and
70 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
71 See id. at 1327-28.
72 Id. at 1321. Plaintiff did, however, deny that he had ever engaged in homo-
sexual conduct after entering the Navy. Id.71 Id. at 321 n.1.
74 Id. at 1327. The court pointed out that "there is no support for [the govern-
ment's] argument that the court must accept without question [its] proffered bases
for the homosexual exclusion policy without analyzing the relevant evidence and
determining whether the policy is motivated by prejudice against homosexuals." Id.
71 Id. at 1328 ("[J]udicial review of military regulations 'is far more deferential
than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian soci-
ety.' However, .... although individual autonomy is not as great within the military
community as it is within the larger civilian community, the essence of individual
constitutional rights nevertheless remain intact.") (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
76 Id. at 1332.
The only inference to be drawn from the [policy's] failure to reach unde-
clared homosexuals is that the threats to military effectiveness posed by
homosexuals, assuming such threats actually exist, arise solely from het-
erosexuals' adverse reactions to [their] presence .... Given this, the court
cannot conceive how the policy cannot be motivated by prejudice.
Id. at 1332-33.
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citing a lack of evidence that he had actually engaged in prohib-
ited homosexual conduct. 77
In Watkins v. United States Army, 78 the Ninth Circuit in-
voked equitable estoppel and ordered the Army to reenlist Ser-
geant Watkins, who was discharged due to his homosexuality. 79
The court held that after repeatedly allowing Watkins to reenlist
despite his acknowledged homosexuality, it was fundamentally
unfair to discharge him.80 The court thus avoided the constitu-
tional equal protection and due process issues raised by the case.
Since the advent of DADT, courts have upheld the law
against constitutional challenges.81 The most common approach
has been to rely on Bowers v. Hardwick 2 in rejecting due process
and equal protection challenges, applying the rational basis
standard of review because there was no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual acts and homosexuality was not a "suspect
classification."8 3 Applying rational basis, courts have sustained
" Id. at 1337-38. The court distinguished the case from Beller v. Middendorf,
632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cited by the government, because that case presented a
substantive due process challenge, not an equal protection challenge, and because
the servicepersons in Beller were found to have engaged in homosexual conduct,
while the plaintiff in this case had simply declared his homosexual status. Dahl, 830
F. Supp. at 1336.
" 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
79 Id. at 711. In 1967, Watkins was drafted into the Army and indicated on his
pre-introduction medical form that he had homosexual tendencies. The Army none-
theless admitted him. A year later, pursuant to an investigation into Watkins' sex-
ual conduct, he signed an affidavit stating that he was gay and that he had engaged
in sodomy with two other servicemen. Id. at 701. Still, the Army did nothing, citing
lack of evidence. Later, after his enlistment period had expired, he was allowed to
reenlist. In subsequent years, Watkins obtained various security clearances that
were occasionally revoked due to his homosexuality, only to be reinstated pursuant
to the recommendations of his commanding officers. The Army repeatedly found
that his homosexuality did not create a problem. Furthermore, Watkins consistently
received outstanding evaluations, often receiving perfect scores, and had undeniably
earned the respect of those who served with him. After the promulgation of Army
Regulation 635-200 chpt. 15, in 1981, which mandated the discharge of all homo-
sexuals, an Army board of review recommended that Watkins be discharged for
stating he was gay. Id. at 701-03. Subsequently, the General in charge of the board
directed that Watkins be discharged, but a district judge intervened and enjoined
the Army from doing so. Id. at 703. The Army appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where
a panel reversed. The full court then granted review to address the issues raised. Id.
at 704.
'o Id. at 711.
81 See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
82 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
83 See, e.g., Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1995). Selland pointed
out that strict scrutiny applies only "when a law infringes a 'fundamental right' or
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DADT, holding that the exclusion of open homosexuals was ra-
tionally related to the military's legitimate interest in maintain-
ing unit cohesion, high morale, and discipline.8 4 In upholding
DADT in Philips v. Perry, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that only homosexual conduct is prohibited, not orienta-
tion; homosexuals are allowed to serve, the court stated, as long
as they refrain from engaging in prohibited conduct.8 5 Accord-
ingly, the court sustained the policy on both equal protection and
due process grounds.8 6
creates a 'suspect classification."' Id. at 265. (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). The court went on to assert that "there is no in-
fringement of a 'fundamental right' in this case." Id. at 265 (citing generally Bowers,
478 U.S. 186). Other circuits have followed a similar approach. See Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that "[tihe suspect or quasi-suspect
classes that are entitled to heightened scrutiny have been limited to groups gener-
ally defined by their status, such as race, national ancestry or ethnic origin,
alienage, gender and illegitimacy, and not by the conduct in which they engage");
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that DADT is sub-
ject to rational basis standard of review because homosexuals are not part of a sus-
pect classification and there is no fundamental constitutional right to engage in ho-
mosexual acts); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that in Bowers, the Supreme Court used a rational basis standard of review);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996).
'4 See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 636; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928-29; see also Phil-
ips, 106 F.3d at 1425-26 (holding that the exclusion policy was rationally related to
the "compelling government purpose" of "maintaining effective armed forces"). Fur-
thermore, the Philips court observed that even under "strict scrutiny," the standard
used in Beller v. Middledorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), and Hatheway v. Sec'y of
the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), before it was deemed inappropriate, the
court still held that the importance of the government's interest outweighed any
privacy rights (Beller) or equal protection rights (Hatheway) that the discharged
members may have had. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1426.
85 Philips, 106 F.3d at 1426-27 (citing its earlier decision in Meinhold v. United
States, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1994), which reversed the servicemember's
discharge because it was based solely on his statement that he was homosexual and
there was no evidence that he ever acted or intended to act in a prohibited manner).
Interestingly, the Philips court cited Meinhold despite the fact that the case in-
volved events that took place prior to the 1993 implementation of DADT. In a foot-
note, the court glossed over the Fourth Circuit's decision in Thomasson which up-
held the "statements" prong of the DADT against an equal protection challenge,
seemingly in contradiction of its own conclusion. Id. at 1427 n.12. The court did not
address this apparent inconsistency.
86 See id. at 1427. The court found that "substantive due process and equal
protection doctrine are 'intertwined for purposes of equal protection analyses of
federal action."' Id. (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 573 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard,
124 F.3d 1126, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the portion of DADT providing
that an admission of homosexuality creates a rebuttable presumption that the
servicemember will engage in homosexual conduct under equal protection);
Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d. 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
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The second approach used by courts upholding DADT has
been to cite a lack of constitutional authority to review military
policies put in place by the executive and legislative branches of
government.8 7 The Constitution gives Congress authority to
raise and support armies, provide for a navy and make rules to
regulate the armed forces,88 while the President is the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces.8 9 The Constitution, how-
ever, says nothing about the authority of the courts vis-A-vis the
military. 90
The third approach is to defer to the judgment of the execu-
tive and legislative branches because of the extensive debate and
lengthy expert testimony that preceded implementation of
DADT.91 For example, in Selland v. Perry,92 the Maryland Dis-
trict Court noted that in formulating the policy, Congress heard
extensive testimony from interested parties, both military and
non-military, and carefully considered the importance of main-
taining an effective military defense capability.93 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Thomasson v. Perry,94 likewise
proved hesitant to second-guess the judgment of the military au-
thorities in carrying out rules established by the executive and
legislative branches,9 5 noting that both branches engaged in an
extensive review of the policy. 96 Before enacting DADT, the
United States, 944 F.2d. 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the court had previ-
ously rejected substantive due process claims, holding them to be foreclosed by Bow-
ers).
87 Carter, supra note 45; see also Philips, 106 F.3d at 1430-31 (Noonan, J., con-
curring) (observing that the courts are not responsible for supervising military dis-
cipline because that is the job of the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment).
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
89 Id. art. II, § 2.
90 See id. art. III.
9' See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
92 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 1995).
9' Id. at 264-65.
94 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
9' See id. at 921 ("Thomasson seeks to upset... a carefully crafted national po-
litical compromise .... the product of sustained and delicate negotiations involving
both the Executive and Legislative branches of our government.").
96 Id. at 922.
The Senate Armed Services Committee held no less than nine days of hear-
ings, including a field hearing at the Norfolk Naval Complex, taking testi-
mony from nearly fifty witnesses. The House Armed Services Committee
held five days of hearings. Witnesses who appeared at these hearings rep-
resented a broad range of views and backgrounds. They included: the Sec-
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House and Senate conducted a thorough debate and both houses
pondered amendments. 97 The Eighth Circuit in Richenberg v.
Perry98 observed that deference to the considered professional
judgment of military authorities was warranted because of the
court's lack of competence in the military realm.99 In Philips v.
Perry,100 the Ninth Circuit justified its deference by pointing out
that Congress made fifteen findings of fact before enacting 10
U.S.C. § 654, the official codification of DADT. 101
B. Predictions of How Courts Will Address the Issue of Judicial
Deference to the Military in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas
Legal commentators have disagreed about the effect Law-
rence will have on the degree of judicial deference afforded to
DADT; some have suggested that the policy's days are num-
bered, 10 2 while others disagreed and predicted that the decision
retary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; military
and legal experts; enlisted personnel, officers and senior military leaders;
and activists supporting and opposing the military's policy.
At the same time, the Department of Defense conducted its own exhaus-
tive review. It convened a military working group composed of senior
members of each service, commissioned a study by the Rand Corporation,
initiated regular consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and leaders of
each service, studied the history of the military's response to social change,
and consulted legal experts.
Id. (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 923. "What Thomasson challenges, therefore, is a statute that embodies
the exhaustive efforts of the democratically accountable branches of American gov-
ernment and an enactment that reflects month upon month of political negotiation
and deliberation .... The courts were not created to award by judicial decree what
was not achievable by political consensus." Id.
98 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1997).
9 Id. at 261.
'0o 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997).
'o' Id. at 1422-23; see also Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir.
1998) (stating that the court "cannot say that the reliance by Congress on the pro-
fessional judgment and testimony of military experts and personnel that those who
engage in homosexual acts would compromise the effectiveness of the military was
irrational").
102 See Paul Schindler, Does Lawrence Trump Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, GAY
CITYNEWS, July 11-17, 2003, at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn228/doeslawrence.
html. Kathi Wescott, a staff attorney with the Servicemembers Legal Defense Net-
work (SLDN), a Washington-based support group for homosexual soldiers, com-
mented that "[c]ourts were viewing Bowers ... as controlling vis-a-vis the federal
[military] sodomy statute," and asserted that Lawrence provides an opportunity to
challenge the military sodomy ban, and that without that ban, the prohibition on
openly homosexual soldiers under DADT will be harder to sustain. Id.
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will have little, if any, effect on future rulings. 10 3 In the wake of
Lawrence, it appears that DADT burdens a fundamental right
and therefore is subject to "strict scrutiny." 10 4 If this is so, courts
will have to agree that DADT is "narrowly tailored to achieve"
the compelling governmental interest of optimal military effec-
tiveness. 105 Although it may appear difficult to argue that DADT
is "narrowly tailored" or that the exclusion of open homosexuals
is related to military effectiveness, in the context of military
questions, courts normally defer to the judgment of the legisla-
tive and executive branches, which in turn defer to the judgment
of the military.10 6 Many commentators, therefore, believe that
DADT will survive due to the unwillingness of courts to upset
the carefully brokered 1993 compromise between Congress and
the President.10 7
103 See Belkin, supra note 5 (discussing the current debate among scholars and
experts on lifting the ban on homosexual personnel); Carter, supra note 45. Profes-
sor Belkin has expressed pessimism about the demise of DADT, despite the positive
sign that a military journal published an article he wrote criticizing the policy. See
Crawford, supra note 5, for a discussion of Belkin's article. An editor at the Depart-
ment of Defense-affiliated quarterly PARAMETERS explained that the journal pub-
lished Belkin's article "because, even though [he] is a gay-rights advocate, he pre-
sented his argument in an unbiased manner, with facts backing up his statements."
Id. While this is seen as encouraging, Belkin remained pessimistic, predicting that
the gay ban will continue for at least five, and possibly as long as twenty, years. Id.
104 Carter, supra note 45. But see Press Release, supra note 4. Not all legal ex-
perts agree that laws affecting homosexuals are now subject to strict scrutiny. For
example, George Fisher, Professor of Law at Stanford University Law School, noted
that the Court in Lawrence did not apply strict scrutiny. Therefore, Fisher posited
that the Court would likely subject DADT to rational basis review rather than strict
scrutiny. Id. Professors James Garland of Hofstra University School of Law and
Chai Feldblum of Georgetown University Law Center agreed, finding it unlikely
that Lawrence will affect DADT. Id. Nonetheless, other experts, like Tobias Wolff,
Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, and Diane Muzur, Professor of
Law at the University of Florida, expressed hope that DADT will now be examined
more closely; they suggested that continued judicial deference to the military's
judgment with regard to DADT should no longer be taken for granted. However,
neither explicitly stated that the policy is now subject to the strict scrutiny level of
review. Id.
105 Carter, supra note 45; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text
(describing rational basis and strict scrutiny standards of review).
"0 Id.; see also Press Release, supra note 65 (describing Congress' deference to
the Department of Defense's influence regarding the reversal of the policy).
107 See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
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III. IT iS No LONGER POSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY THE CONTINUATION
OF DADT AFTER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
A. Pre-Lawrence Justifications for Military Policies Excluding
Homosexuals
Proponents of DADT predict disastrous consequences if ho-
mosexuals are allowed to serve openly in the military. 108 They
argue that the effectiveness of the armed forces would be se-
verely compromised because heterosexual servicemembers would
be unwilling to live and serve alongside homosexuals. 10 9 It is
also said that the judiciary should defer to the judgment of the
elected branches of government on this matter because DADT
has been widely debated and is the culmination of many years of
study and consideration;110 furthermore, the executive and legis-
lative branches have a constitutional mandate to regulate the
armed forces, while the judicial branch does not.11" '
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has said that histori-
cally there are four principal arguments against allowing homo-
sexuals in the military: (1) homosexuals are likely to be black-
mailed into revealing military secrets; 112 (2) homosexuals tend to
be less stable than heterosexuals;"13 (3) homosexual superior offi-
'08 See Belkin, supra note 5, at 110.
'09 See NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., RAND CORP., Sexual Orientation and U.S.
Military Personnel Policy: Policy Options and Assessment, 24-25 (1993),
http://www.rand.org/publicationsMRMR323/mr323.chl.pdf.
110 See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
"' See Carter, supra note 45; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art II,
§ 2; U.S. CONST. art. III.
112 POSNER, supra note 28, at 314-15. Posner called this argument weak and
not applicable to open homosexuals since they presumably do not have to hide the
fact that they are gay. Id. However, Posner's dismissal of this argument failed to
consider the situation of a "closeted" homosexual who does not want his fellow ser-
vicemembers to know his secret.
113 Id at 315. Posner conceded that although this may be true, it would nonethe-
less be irrelevant since stereotypical effeminate gays are unlikely to join the mili-
tary. Also, if gay men are less suited to military service, the flip side of the argu-
ment is that gay women are more suited to the military than heterosexual women.
In any event, the military screens applicants for suitability, so gays that are unfit
for service can be screened out due to mental instability and there would be no need
to exclude all known homosexuals. See id. "The Crittenden Report contains the flat
statement, apparently by the chief of naval personnel, that there is no correlation
between homosexuality and either ability or attainments." Id. at 316. (citing the
Crittenden Report, Report of the Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recom-
mendations to the Secretary of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures and
Directives Dealing with Homosexuals (Dec. 21, 1956 to Mar. 15, 1957)).
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cers might force subordinates into performing sexual favors; 114
(4) the inclusion of homosexuals will adversely affect the morale
of heterosexual service members and reduce the effectiveness of
the armed forces. 115
At first glance, these justifications may have seemed compel-
ling, or at least reasonable. A growing body of evidence, how-
ever, has slowly eroded the foundations of such arguments. The
following section examines this evidence.
B. Pre-Lawrence Arguments Against Military Policies
Excluding Homosexuals
1. Such Policies are Unnecessary and Possibly Detrimental to
the Military
Many open homosexuals serve in the military without issue
so long as they are discreet about their orientation. 116 Empirical
1,4 Id. at 316. Posner dismissed this argument. "[Tihis bridge was crossed when
the armed forces admitted women over the same objection .... This is not to deny
that [homosexuals in the armed forces can be a problem] .... It just is not ordinarily
thought a sufficiently serious problem to warrant the blanket exclusion of a whole
class of [persons]." Id.
115 Id.
[W]hy do I say that the argument.., is a good argument for exclusion?...
Because the question of morale is separable from the question of the merits
of the exclusion. Suppose American Soldiers harbored the irrational but
unshakable belief that to attack on Friday the thirteenth would bring dis-
aster .... If it was very important to attack on Friday the thirteenth, [their
commander] might try to educate the soldiers out of their superstition; but
if it was not very important... he might think it best to yield. It is the
same with the homosexual question.
Id. at 318.
116 Id. at 317.
There is no reason to believe that homosexuals who ... pass all the physi-
cal, mental, and psychological tests that the armed forces adminis-
ter ... are militarily less effective than heterosexuals, or cause trouble, or
otherwise degrade military performance. Many homosexuals are known to
have served in... the Second World War, the Korean War, and the Viet-
nam War, and studies of their military records show that they did as well
on average as the heterosexuals.
Id. Interestingly, during World War II many German gays sought refuge from Nazi
persecution by joining the army "because the military command was too busy to
worry about trying to root out homosexuals; evidently they were not considered a
threat to effective military performance." Id. at 317. "[F]or the most part they are
accepted, generally without fuss, unless they get arrested or otherwise misbehave in
ways that would land heterosexuals in trouble for corresponding forms of sexual
misconduct." Id. at 320. However, not everyone cares to hear about how well homo-
sexuals can function in the military. For instance, during Congressional debates on
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evidence disproving the justifications for banning homosexuals
began to accumulate in 1957 with the Crittenden Report com-
missioned by the Navy to evaluate the alleged negative effects of
homosexual servicemembers on morale and unit cohesion. 117
"The Navy considered the Crittenden report sufficiently damag-
ing that it chose to suppress it for the next two decades." 118 At
least two other studies commissioned by the Department of De-
fense similarly called into question the judgment of excluding
homosexuals. One is a report written for the Department of De-
fense's Personnel Security Research and Education Center
(PERSEREC) in 1988 by Berkeley psychologist Theodore Sarbin
and Navy Captain Kenneth Karols, and the other is the RAND
report commissioned at the request of President Clinton. 119 The
PERSEREC report concluded that there was no evidence that
the inclusion of homosexuals in the military would have an ad-
verse effect on morale or security, and accordingly recommended
the elimination of the ban.' 20 The General Accounting Office
(GAO) released its own analysis regarding the exclusion of ho-
mosexuals in June of 1992 and confirmed the PERSEREC find-
ings.12' The RAND report similarly concluded that it was possi-
ble to lift the ban on homosexuals without damaging unit
cohesion. 122
The dissent in Thomasson v. Perry pointed out that even
though the military insists that "tolerating [prejudice against
homosexuals] is essential to 'unit cohesion[,]' . . . there is no evi-
dence that the discharge of [homosexuals] will rationally further
that purpose."123 Ironically, exclusionary policies like DADT can
DADT, testimony including accounts of homosexuals serving gallantly was sup-
pressed by supporters of the ban. See Belkin, supra note 5, at 117 ("When [Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman] Nunn learned that the testimony of retired
Army Colonel Lucian K. Truscott III would include accounts of open gay soldiers
who had served with distinction, Nunn deleted Truscott from the witness list.").
117 See Nunan, supra note 51 (citing generally RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT




121 Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT ON GAYS IN THE
MILITARY (1992), http://www.fordam.edulhalsall/pwh/gao-report.html.
122 Nunan, supra note 51; see also NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST, supra note 109,
at 14-15 (discussing the effectiveness of integration of homosexuals into the mili-
tary in foreign nations).
123 Thomason v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 951 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting).
There are at least three ... major problems with the 'unit cohesion' argu-
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actually harm morale and unit cohesion by encouraging lying on
the part of homosexual servicemembers who are required to keep
their sexual orientation a secret.1 24 Because no one knows who
is homosexual and who is not, servicemembers may have reason
to be wary of the leering eyes of closet homosexuals. 125 DADT
proved harmful to military morale in 2002, when the public
widely criticized the policy upon learning that almost two-dozen
Army linguists, many of whom spoke Arabic, were discharged
under the policy. 126
2. The Experiences of Foreign Militaries Prove that
Homosexuals Can Serve
Homosexuals have long served in foreign militaries without
the dire consequences predicted by proponents of their exclusion.
This was verified by the independent research center RAND,
which, at the request of then-President Clinton, began a study in
April 1993 to determine the viability of his plan to lift the ban on
homosexuals in the military. 127
RAND sent staff members to seven foreign countries to ob-
serve their militaries and to interview their members. 128 Both
the Netherlands and Norway followed a policy of nondiscrimina-
tion with regard to homosexuals in the military. 129 In 1992,
Canada dropped its military ban on homosexuals altogether.1 30
ment. First, it represents a severe and somewhat defeatist underestima-
tion of the ability of today's servicemembers to keep their focus on profes-
sional military concerns .... Second, kowtowing to the prejudices of some
by excluding others has never been an acceptable policy rationale
.... [T]hird, in the several units where acknowledged homosexuals are
serving today (usually, by court order), there are no signs of unit disinte-
gration or bad morale.
Id. at 951-52 (quoting Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense under
President Reagan).
124 Id. at 953; see also Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1437-38 (9th Cir.
1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
.25 Philips, 106 F.3d at 1438 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
126 Press Release, supra note 65; see also Carter, supra note 45 (discussing the
government's alleged compelling interest in enacting the DADT statute which "pro-
mote[s] unit cohesion, morale and discipline.., ultimately relat[ing] directly to our
national security").
127 NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST, supra note 109, at 2.
28 Id. at 11. RAND researchers visited the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and Norway. Id. 'In all of the countries visited,
sodomy ha[d] been decriminalized in the civil law." Id. at 13.
129 Id. at 12.
"0 Id. at 13.
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The French did not have an official policy, but "[i]n general, the
French approach [was that] private sexual conduct [was] not
relevant to performance of military duties."1 31 The Israeli policy
was that everyone who was physically capable should be avail-
able to defend the country. 132 "Israeli officials directly refuted
the ... assertion that homosexual men [were] not permitted to
serve in combat units, or were treated like women and given
clerical jobs ... stating that all such decisions [were] made on a
case-by-case basis."133 Even Germany, which excluded open ho-
mosexuals from service, had a flexible policy for homosexuals
who were already serving. 134 Overall, no serious problems were
reported concerning the presence of homosexuals in the Nether-
lands, Norway, Canada or Israel, all of which had policies of total
nondiscrimination. 135 Furthermore, none of the militaries RAND
studied for the report indicated that their performance had been
hampered by the presence of homosexuals. 136
A decade after the RAND study, Professor Aaron Belkin also
undertook an examination of the experiences of foreign militar-
ies and concluded that the ban on homosexuals is based on
prejudice rather than necessity. 137 He noted that the Center for
the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military ("CSSMM") con-
ducted its own study, similar to, but more recent than RAND's,
concentrating on only four countries: Australia, Canada, Israel,
and Britain.138 CSSMM interviewed every pro-gay and anti-gay
131 Id. at 12.
132 See id. On June 11, 1993, Israel "reaffirmed its policy of nondiscrimination,
removed the requirement that homosexuals undergo a mental examination, and no
longer automatically prohibit[ed] them from holding top-level security clearances."
Id.
'33 Id.
134 Id. at 13. Basically, if a known homosexual were performing satisfactorily,
he would not be discharged. Id. at 13-14.
"' Id. at 14.
136 Id. at 15. There were some reports of "ridicule or violence," although they
were so rare that it was not deemed necessary to take special precautionary meas-
ures to address them. Id.
137 See Belkin, supra note 5, at 109 ("[L]ifting bans on homosexual personnel
does not threaten unit cohesion or undermine military effectiveness.").
138 Id. Furthermore, the report noted:
[These countries were chosen] because all four lifted their gay bans despite
opposition from the military services; because the United States, Australia,
Canada, and Britain share important cultural traditions; because the Is-
rael Defense Forces are among the most combat-tested militaries in the
world; and because prior to lifting its ban, Britain's policy was often cited
as support for those opposed to allowing homosexual personnel to serve
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expert it could locate. 139 The study revealed that each country
had different motivations for abolishing its military ban on ho-
mosexuals. 140 The 104 experts interviewed unanimously con-
cluded that removing the ban on homosexuals had not "under-
mined military performance, readiness, or cohesion, led to
increased difficulties in recruiting or retention, or increased the
rate of HIV infection among the troops."'41 This result occurred
because the military leaders in each country issued regulations
holding heterosexual and homosexual soldiers to the same stan-
dards of conduct and insisted that soldiers abstain from abuse or
harassment. 142 The study also revealed, unsurprisingly, that the
majority of homosexual soldiers in the four countries did not
immediately reveal their orientation once it became permissible
to do so. 143 Despite all of this encouraging evidence, "[e]xperts
openly in the United States.
Id.
"9 Id. The experts included "officers and enlisted personnel, ministry represen-
tatives, academics, veterans, politicians, and nongovernmental observers." Id. Over-
all, a total of 104 experts were interviewed and 622 documents and articles were
examined. Id. at 110.
140 Id. at 110. In Canada, the ban was lifted pursuant to a court order in Octo-
ber 1992, holding that the ban violated Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Id. In Australia, it was lifted in November 1992 by the liberal government of Prime
Minister Paul Keating at a time when "the country was integrating a number of in-
ternational human rights conventions into its domestic laws and codes." Id. In Is-
rael, the "public outcry against" the ban that followed "dramatic Knesset hearings"
lead the military to lift the ban in June of 1993. Id. Finally, Britain lifted its ban in
January 2000, four months after "the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
[the ban] violated the right to privacy guaranteed in the European Convention on
Human Rights." Id.
'41 Id. Furthermore, the "dire predictions" that preceded the lifting of the bans
in Canada and Britain did not come to pass. Id. In Australia, Commodore R.W.
Gates, who holds a rank equivalent to that of a one-star admiral, "remarked that
the lifting of the ban was 'an absolute non-event."' Id. Significantly, even those who
most vehemently opposed the inclusion of homosexuals in the military conceded
that the removal of the ban did not have an adverse effect on the armed forces. Id.
at 111.
142 Id. at 111-12. This "emphasis on conduct and equal standards seem[ed] to
work," with few if any cases of harassment of homosexuals. Id. at 112.
143 Id. at 112. Even prior to the lifting of the ban on homosexuals, many gay ser-
vicemembers were known among their peers. Id. This is similar to the current
situation in the United States. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 319-20. Once the ban
on gays was lifted in those countries, small numbers of gay soldiers, gradually, over
time, disclosed their sexual orientation. See Belkin, supra note 5, at 112. One Cana-
dian lesbian soldier commented that gay soldiers were never interested in being
'really, really out,"' instead, they just wanted to be secure in their jobs, knowing
that they would not be fired solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. Id. at
113. In Britain, experts have noted that most homosexuals in the military have not
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who support the exclusion of homosexual soldiers from the
[United States] armed forces often claim that foreign military
experiences are not applicable to the American case."144 Profes-
sor Belkin conceded that homosexuals sometimes receive special
treatment in foreign militaries, but typically only inasmuch as
such treatment was an attempt to "resolve problems flexibly." 145
Significantly, there is nothing to indicate that such minor differ-
ential treatment adversely affected "performance, cohesion,
readiness, or morale."1 46 Although different countries have dif-
ferent cultures, the United States, Canada, Britain, and Austra-
lia "share many cultural traditions," and these countries, along
with Israel, possess cultures that are largely homophobic.1 47
3. Experiences of American Police and Fire Departments
Support the Assertion that Homosexuals Can Serve in the
Military
The experiences of American police and fire departments in
integrating homosexuals demonstrate that homosexuals can
revealed their orientation to their peers, "reflecting their keen awareness of appro-
priate behavior in the military." Id. In Israel, "[als more gay Israelis have grown
comfortable about expressing their orientation in recent years ... greater openness
has been found in the military." Id. at 113. A University of Chicago study found that
there are only seven gays serving openly in the Chicago police department and only
about one hundred in the New York Police Department. Belkin, supra note 5, at
116. Police departments are "quasi-military," and thus offer a fitting analogy to ad-
mission of homosexuals into the military. POSNER, supra note 28, at 319. It stands
to reason then that there would not be a mass coming out among gay servicemem-
bers if the United States were to lift its ban. "Dr. Laura Miller, previously on the
faculty of the UCLA Sociology Department and now with the RAND Corporation,
argues that.., most homosexual American soldiers will not disclose their sexual
orientation if the United States changes its policy unless and until it is safe to do
so." Belkin, supra note 5, at 116.
'44 Belkin, supra note 5, at 113. Such persons further claim that gays in foreign
militaries receive "special treatment," that the United States is culturally different
than foreign countries, and that there are no known gay soldiers serving in foreign
combat units. Id.
145 Id. at 114.
For example, some heterosexual soldiers in Israel are allowed to live off
base or to change units if they are having trouble with their group, and
some commanders allow heterosexual soldiers to shower privately. In other
cases, unequal treatment consists of minor privileges accorded to hetero-
sexuals, not special rights for gay and lesbian soldiers. Homosexual sol-
diers in the Australian and British militaries, for example, are not entitled
to the same domestic partner benefits that heterosexuals receive.
Id.
146 id.
141 Id. at 115.
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serve in the military, because police and fire departments "share
a number of characteristics with the ... military that make them
the closest domestic analog." 148 RAND researchers visited police
and fire departments in six American cities that include open
homosexuals. 149 They focused on the behavioral responses of
both homosexuals and heterosexuals to the inclusion of homo-
sexuals and the "organizational strategies and policies put into
place to implement the nondiscrimination policies."'150 The re-
searchers found that nearly all homosexuals who join police and
fire departments "conform to the norms and customs of the or-
ganization they are joining."151 Given the high degree of anti-
homosexual sentiment, most homosexuals were slow to reveal
their orientation to their co-workers. 52 Homosexuals proved ea-
ger to conform and "prove [their] worth," so they were unlikely to
engage in behavior that would undermine these goals. 153 The in-
tegration of homosexuals was by no means free from difficulty.
For instance, there was widespread fear among heterosexuals
that homosexuals would receive special treatment or that at-
tempts would be made to "educate" heterosexuals to modify their
attitudes. 15 4 The leadership of the departments effectively ad-
dressed these fears and minimized any resulting problems. 155
None of the departments visited reported diminished effective-
ness as a result of the presence of homosexuals. 156
4. The Number of Discharges for Homosexuality Diminishes
During Wartime
Past actions of military leaders demonstrate that they do not
actually believe that the inclusion of homosexuals adversely af-
fects military performance. The military's enforcement of exclu-
148 NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST, supra note 109, at 15.
149 Id. at 16. The six cities visited were Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New
York, San Diego and Seattle. Id. Posner suggested that the comparison of domestic
police departments to the military is appropriate because "[p]olice forces are quasi-
military." POSNER, supra note 28, at 319.
"s0 NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST, supra note 109, at 16.
"' Id. "[T]hose who join police departments, for example, [wanted] to be 'cops,'
not 'homosexual cops."' Id.
.52 Id. at 17.
153 Id. at 18.
114 Id. at 19.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 19-20; see also POSNER, supra note 28, at 319 ("[A] large number of
homosexuals already serve without significant difficulties.").
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sionary policies drops off markedly during periods of war.1 57
Journalist Randy Shilts compiled evidence demonstrating that
the military never had an aversion to enlisting homosexuals
while the country was in the midst of armed conflict, and that
the number of discharges for homosexuality only rose when the
country experienced periods of relative peace. 158
5. Arguments for Excluding Homosexuals Mirror Those Once
Used to Support Racial Segregation of the Armed Forces
Although it is not possible to directly compare racial deseg-
regation with the inclusion of homosexuals in the military, there
are a number of valuable insights to be gained from drawing
analogies. 159 The main argument of those opposed to racial inte-
gration was that white servicemembers did not want to live or
serve alongside blacks. The rhetoric used was remarkably simi-
lar to that used today with regard to DADT. 160 Although a ma-
jority of Americans opposed the racial integration of the military
in the late 1940s, public opinion changed over time.161  By the
157 See Nunan, supra note 51.
158 Id. Moreover:
Shilts offers statistical evidence for his thesis, but he also discusses con-
crete examples to illustrate how this came to be. Watkins v. United States
Army, 879 F.2d 699 (9th Circuit, 1989) is the best of these. After openly
admitting to "homosexual tendencies" on his draft physical form in 1967,
Perry Watkins was drafted in 1968. During the height of the Vietnam War,
military authorities needed able-bodied soldiers, and since sexual orienta-
tion could be used as a shield to avoid the draft, authorities were reluctant
to enforce that policy, especially when the inductees were black, like Wat-
kins. It was only in 1980, long after Watkins had decided to make a career
in the Army, that the machinery to discharge him finally began to creak
into action. The en banc 7-4 Ninth Circuit decision reinstating Watkins,
upheld after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1990, (110 S. Ct. 196),
was based on the fairness issue created by the Army's decision to first
enlist an acknowledged homosexual and then discharge him on that
ground [i.e., equitable estoppel]. In doing so, the court backed away from
its 1988 2-1 panel decision supporting Watkins on constitutional equal pro-
tection grounds (847 F.2d 1329).
Id. at n.21; see generally RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS AND
LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993) (discussing the Army's historical responses
to homosexuals in the military).
159 NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 109, at 20. The integration of black
and white service members was "said to be inconsistent with prevailing societal
norms and likely to create tensions and disruptions in military units and to impair
combat effectiveness." Id.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 20-22.
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time of the RAND study in 1993, public opinion was more favor-
able towards allowing homosexuals to serve in the military than
it was to racial integration back in the 1940s. 162 The experience
of racial integration suggests that civilian and military leader-
ship can successfully overcome any initial resistance to change
and can reduce the fears of opponents about the harmful effects
on unit performance. 163
It has been argued that the racial analogy is inappropriate
because the courts did not play a part in the integration of the
armed services.164 Nevertheless, courts today surely would not
allow a re-instituted policy of racial segregation, regardless of
whether it had popular support. 165
6. Policies Excluding Homosexuals from the Military no Longer
Reflect Public Attitudes
The retired Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Ad-
miral John D. Hutson, has declared that he now believes DADT
should be abandoned. 166 While admitting that he initially had
supported the policy, he conceded that much has changed since
1993.167 Given today's political and social climate, Admiral
162 Id. at 22.
163 id.
164 Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, this was done
upon the executive order of President Truman, exercising his proper Constitutional
authority. See id.; Exec. Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311 (July 28, 1948).
165 See Philips, 106 F.3d at 1439 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
[T]here is no doubt ... the courts would easily reject the military's asser-
tions of "unit cohesion," "morale," and "discipline" and strike down the pol-
icy as violative of equal protection. While racial classifications are subject
to a stricter level of scrutiny, these asserted interests, which are based on
animosity towards the disfavored class, are no more acceptable when used
to support the exclusion of gay[s] from the military.
Id.; see also Nunan, supra note 51.
If it were argued today that black skin was incompatible with military ser-
vice because of the adverse affect it would have on the unit cohesion of
white racists, the Court would not tolerate it. Unfortunately ... [w]hile
discrimination against people of color is no longer socially fashionable in
our society, the same cannot be said about discrimination against homo-
sexuals.
Id.
166 Press Release, supra note 65.
167 Id. The Admiral has said that, given the previous decade's worth of experi-
ence with DADT and "with what he called a 'somewhat more enlightened popula-
tion, particularly among younger people,' he now believes it's time to end the ban."
Id.
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Hutson believes that lifting the ban could serve to strengthen
the military by increasing public support for the institution. 168
Public support for allowing homosexuals to serve in the mili-
tary is also increasing. 16 9 It has been said, however, that favor-
able polls "are not necessary for maintaining cohesion, readiness,
morale, and performance after the integration of a minority
group into the military," since the military is fully capable of
achieving these goals-with or without public support. 170
7. The Cost of Enforcing Exclusionary Policies is Prohibitive
Millions of dollars are spent each year to identify, discharge,
and then replace homosexual servicemembers.1 7' Because the
Department of Defense does not keep records of the specific costs
of administering the exclusionary policy, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) had to estimate its expense. Using the available
figures, it found that during the 1990 fiscal year, "recruiting and
initial training costs associated with the replacement of person-
nel discharged for homosexuality were estimated to be $28,226
for each enlisted troop and $120,772 for each officer."1 72 Fur-
thermore, the GAO found that, from 1980 to 1990, about 17,000
servicemembers were discharged for being homosexual.' 73
C. DADT Cannot Survive in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas.
Assuming Lawrence v. Texas requires courts to strictly scru-
tinize laws affecting homosexuals, the seven arguments above
illustrate that DADT is not narrowly tailored to meet a compel-
ling government interest. A law excluding an entire class of per-
sons, based solely on conduct that effectively defines such per-
sons, from serving in the military is arguably not narrowly
168 Id.
169 A 1989 Gallop poll found that 60% of respondents favored allowing gays to
serve in the military. POSNER, supra note 28, at 319. More recent Gallup polls indi-
cate that 72% of Americans support allowing homosexuals to serve in the military
and 56% believe that open gays should be allowed to serve. Belkin, supra note 5, at
115 (citing Frank Newport, Gallup Poll News Service, In-Depth Analyses: Homo-
sexuality (Sept. 2002), at http://www.gallup.com/poll/analysis/ia020911v.asp)).
170 Belkin, supra note 5, at 115. For example, 63 % of Americans opposed the
racial integration of the military at the time President Truman forced the issue by
ordering the military to end racial segregation. Id.
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tailored. 174 Furthermore, even if DADT were narrowly tailored,
the weight of empirical evidence proves that the inclusion of
open homosexuals does not diminish military effectiveness. 175
In the alternative, if courts were to continue to apply ra-
tional basis review to DADT, Lawrence makes it more difficult to
hold that the exclusion of homosexuals is rationally related to
the legitimate government purpose of maintaining a highly effec-
tive military. Lawrence, by confirming the rights of homosexuals
to live their lives without undue government interference, has
changed the way courts will consider laws relating to homosexu-
als. This is already apparent with regard to gay marriage. 176
Given this new paradigm, it is likely that courts, even using ra-
tional basis review, will begin to doubt that DADT is rationally
related to its intended purpose.
It is time for the courts to overcome their traditional reti-
cence to challenge the judgment of the executive and legislative
branches with regard to military policy and step in to overturn
DADT. Judicial deference is not warranted absent evidence jus-
tifying challenged policies, as illustrated by Korematsu.177 Like
the internment order, "the 1994 decision to codify the ban on
gays in the military contravened available empirical evidence,
and was based instead exclusively on political considerations
buttressed by the testimony of generals. ' 178
74 See Carter, supra note 45.
175 See supra notes 116-173 and accompanying text.
176 See Belluck, supra note 18; see also Greenhouse, supra note 18.
177 See Nunan, supra note 51.
In the internment case, in addition to the evidence of racist motivations
which fueled [Justice] Murphy's Korematsu dissent, the historical record
reveals that army intelligence analysts reported to Chief of Staff George
Marshall that mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was unnecessary.
This report was issued the very day Roosevelt signed his executive order
permitting the internment. Brigadier General Mark Clark, to whom Mar-
shall had assigned the task of evaluating the military threat posed by
Japanese on the West Coast, had come to the same conclusion a week ear-
lier. The decision to proceed with internment plans was a political one, not
a military one, based on pressure from the public, from politicians, and
from civilian personnel in Roosevelt's cabinet. The pretext for a military
justification was based on the testimony of generals who stood to enlarge
their own spheres of responsibility as a result of the enactment of the in-
ternment policy.
Id. (citing generally Peter Irons, Justice at War: The Story of The Japanese Ameri-
can Internment Cases (1983)).
171 Id. (citing generally Shilts, supra note 158).
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In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, the arguments favoring
judicial intervention to overturn DADT stand on much firmer
ground. Even prior to Lawrence, many circuit court judges, in
their dissents, argued that DADT was unconstitutional. For ex-
ample, Judge Hall observed in his Thomasson dissent that
"[alt]hough the delicacy of the situation stems from the respect
we owe the legislature and executive, the gravity inheres in our
duty to defend the Constitution against the trespasses of those
branches, no matter how carefully or pedantically they be con-
structed, and notwithstanding their popularity."'' 79 Judge Hall
further argued that Lt. Thomasson was not discharged as a re-
sult of engaging in prohibited conduct, but rather solely because
he was gay.'80 Hall observed that "the desire to disadvantage a
politically unpopular group is never a legitimate governmental
interest,"18' and suggested that "[tihere is a great deal of evi-
dence that the statute was motivated by a desire to accommodate
prejudice against homosexuals."'18 2 Furthermore, Hall contended
that the policy operates in an unconstitutional manner: "Its bed-
rock is a presumption that everyone will fail to comply with rules
of conduct-a declared homosexual is bound to misbehave, and
the members of his unit will doubtless allow private prejudice to
override discipline.' ' 3
179 Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 949 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting).
Judge Hall criticized the overgeneralization of homosexuals as a group:
It is critical in this case to resist falling into discussion of generalities, as if
each homosexual were a clone of some preening archetype.... Even with-
out the challenged policy, some homosexuals would be unfit for military
service, and some among them whose sexual misconduct were the root of
their unfitness. The same, of course, can be said for heterosexuals.
Id. at 950.
"0 Id. at 950. Judge Hall pointed out that Thomasson's service record was
"sparkling." Admiral Konetzni (who ironically was in charge of implementing
DADT) recommended Thomasson for immediate promotion to Lieutenant Com-
mander on the very day of his discharge. Hall further noted that the Navy had no
proof that Thomasson engaged in sodomy or broken any other rule of conduct. Hall
thus concluded that Thomasson was discharged solely because he stated that he
was homosexual. Id.
' Id. at 951.
182 Id. The President stated that " 'those who oppose lifting the ban are clearly
focused not on the conduct of individual gay service members, but on how non-gay
service members feel about gays in general and, in particular, those in the military
service."' Id.
183 Id. at 953. Judge Hall argued that a presumption of misconduct from a per-
son's status, or even from his private prejudices, does not comport with due process.
Lieutenant Thomasson offered a good analogy at oral argument. He pointed out that
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The Philips dissent similarly asserted that there is no ra-
tional basis for the continued existence of DADT. ls4 Because the
majorities in both Thomasson and Philips relied on the Bowers
proposition that there is no fundamental right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy and that homosexuals do not make up a sus-
pect classification, 8 5 it is likely that these dissenting arguments
will prevail now that Lawrence has overruled Bowers.
CONCLUSION
With Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court identified a
constitutional right to liberty and explicitly stated that it is
unlawful for states to pass laws prohibiting both homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy.'86 Following this development, a strong
argument can be made that DADT will now be subject to the
"strict scrutiny" level of constitutional review, rather than the
"rational basis" standard previously employed. 8 7 While there is
some precedent of courts upholding DADT even after a strict
scrutiny analysis, 88 it is unlikely that this would happen today,
given the current societal and governmental trends away from
discrimination against homosexuals. Six of the nine justices on
the Supreme Court have clearly indicated that they will no
longer tolerate discrimination against homosexuals in the ab-
sence of a very compelling reason.8 9 In light of the large and
growing body of evidence confirming that the inclusion of homo-
sexuals in the military does not have adverse affects, it is becom-
ing increasingly difficult to argue that DADT bears any relation
in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld the mili-
tary policy forbidding the wearing of yarmulkes. Supposing a serviceman were to
write a letter to his superior stating that he is an Orthodox Jew, could it be said
that he violated the regulation? Should he be dismissed because he has a "propen-
sity" to wear a yarmulke? Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 953. Would his discharge be justi-
fied "because his status and accompanying presumed propensity are presumed to
stir up anti-Semitism among the majority gentiles?" Id. Thomasson pointed out how
silly this was, concluding with the observation that "[i]f persons do not obey rules
with which they disagree, or are presumed to act upon every urge or desire what-
ever the legal consequences, then rules are a vain exercise indeed." Id.
184 See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dis-
senting).
185 See supra note 83.
"'6 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
187 See Carter, supra note 45.
188 See generally Hatheway v. Sec'y of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981);
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
189 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484, 2488.
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to military necessity. 190 It is clear that the current policy is
based on outdated prejudices.
Now that Bowers v. Hardwick is no longer good law, it is
likely that at least one of the circuit courts will conclude for the
first time that DADT violates the due process right to liberty.
An appeal to such a holding would result in a circuit split that
would virtually compel the Supreme Court to address the issue.
Considering the language used in Lawrence, it is likely that the
current Court would prove willing to examine very critically-
i.e., strictly scrutinize-any arguments made in defense of
DADT. Given the utter lack of empirical evidence supporting the
argument that the inclusion of open homosexuals would seri-
ously undermine our military capabilities, and the mounting
evidence in support of the opposite conclusion,' 9 ' it is increas-
ingly likely that the Supreme Court will one day strike down
DADT as unconstitutional.
190 See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 5, at 118.
191 See supra notes 116-73 and accompanying text.
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